



Genome Institute
of Singapore

Regional Biosecurity Workshop

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How might we deal with bioterrorist threats?



- **Block access to dangerous agents**
- **Detect trafficking**
- **Detect outbreak**
- **Trace to source**

Category A

- Bacillus anthracis (anthrax)
- Clostridium botulinum toxin (botulism)
- Yersinia pestis (plague)
- Variola major (smallpox) and other related pox viruses
- Francisella tularensis (tularemia)
- Viral hemorrhagic fevers
 - Arenaviruses
 - LCM, Junin virus, Machupo virus, Guanarito virus
 - Lassa Fever
 - Bunyaviruses
 - Hantaviruses
 - Rift Valley Fever
 - Flaviruses
 - Dengue
 - Filoviruses
 - Ebola
 - Marburg

Category B

- Burkholderia pseudomallei
- Coxiella burnetii (Q fever)
- Brucella species (brucellosis)
- Burkholderia mallei (glanders)
- Chlamydia psittaci (Psittacosis)*
- Ricin toxin (from Ricinus communis)
- Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens
- Staphylococcus enterotoxin B
- Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii)
- Food and Waterborne Pathogens
 - Bacteria
 - Diarrheagenic E.coli
 - Pathogenic Vibrios
 - Shigella species
 - Salmonella
 - Listeria monocytogenes
 - Campylobacter jejuni
 - Yersinia enterocolitica)
 - Viruses (Caliciviruses, Hepatitis A)
 - Protozoa
 - Cryptosporidium parvum
 - Cyclospora cayatanensis
 - Giardia lamblia
 - Entamoeba histolytica
 - Toxoplasma
 - Microsporidia


**With only a few exceptions,
candidate bioterrorism agents
look like standard infectious disease
agents**

How did we deal with a serious infectious threat?

- **Organization**
- **Technologies**
- **Communications**

Singapore Battle Plan: SARS CoV

April 2, 2003




Viral Genome Discovery



SARS-Cov genome coverage by shotgun libraries

Taq I library (2000 reads)

Csp6I library (2000 reads)



There is no distinction between good research and essential public health measures

MECHANISMS OF DISEASE*


Mechanisms of disease

🌐 @ Comparative full-length genome sequence analysis of 14 SARS coronavirus isolates and common mutations associated with putative origins of infection

Yi-Jun Ruan, Chia Lin Wei, Ling Ai Eo, Vinensius B Vega, Hervé Thoreau, Se Thoe Su Yun, Jor-Ming Chia, Patrick Ng, Kuo Ping Chiu, Landri Lim, Zhang Tao, Chan Kweal Peng, Lynette Don Lin Ean, Ng Mah Lee, Leo Yee Sin, Lisa F P Ng, Ren Ee Chee, Lawrence W Stanton, Philip M Long, Edison T Liu

Lancet. May 24;361(9371):1779-85, 2003.

Direct the diagnostics here



There are 129 places in the SARS genome different amongst the 14 SARS isolates.

Want diagnostics that will work on all isolates.


Detection of SARS CoV in blood of infected patients

Lisa F. P. Ng¹, Michelle Wong², Susie Koh², Ooi Eng Eong³, Tang Kin Fai³, Leong Hoe Nam⁵, Ling Ai Ee⁴, Lora V. Agathe¹, Jenny Tan¹, Edison T. Liu¹, Ren Ee Chee^{1,6}, Ng Lee Ching² and Martin L. Hibberd^{1*}

- 1. Genome Institute of Singapore, Singapore** (Lisa F.P. Ng PhD, Lora V. Agathe, Jenny Tan, Edison T. Liu MD, Ren Ee Chee PhD, Martin L. Hibberd PhD);
- 2. DSO National Laboratories, Singapore** (Michelle Wong, Susie Koh, Ng Lee Ching PhD);
- 3. Environmental Health Institute, National Environment Agency, Singapore** (Ooi Eng Eong PhD, Tang Kin Fai PhD);
- 4. Department of Pathology, Singapore General Hospital, Singapore** (Ling Ai Ee MD);
- 5. Tan Tock Seng Hospital, Singapore** (Leong Hoe Nam MBBS);
- 6. Department of Microbiology, National University of Singapore** (Ren Ee Chee PhD)

*Correspondence to: Dr Martin L. Hibberd, Genome Institute of Singapore, 1 Science Park Road, #05-01, Singapore 117528
(email: gismlh@nus.edu.sg)






Generation 0



Contact Map

Generation 1

Singapore






Canada




Hanoi



Generation 2




Generation 3



Generation 5




Generation 6



Assignment of SARS CoV strains assists in contact mapping and contagion monitoring

Need: to develop a fast and inexpensive genotyping approach

385,000 probes to sequence the SARS genome




1 tech can process
50 samples in 5 days
\$500 per sample
vs
5 techs at 10 samples
in 5 days

Sequencing by Hybridization



```
..TTTGGGAAGAGAAGTCCCCCAACCGACATTCGGACAACCCTGTAGGCCGCATGGTCACCC..  
..AAACCCTTCTCTTCAGGGGGTTGGCTGTA..  
TTTGGGAAGAGAAGACCCCCAACCGACAT  
..AAACCCTTCTCTTCAGGGGGTTGGCTGTA..  
TTTGGGAAGAGAAGTCCCCCAACCGACAT  
..AAACCCTTCTCTTCAGGGGGTTGGCTGTA..  
TTTGGGAAGAGAAGCCCCCCAACCGACAT  
..AAACCCTTCTCTTCAGGGGGTTGGCTGTA..  
TTTGGGAAGAGAAGGCCCCCAACCGACAT
```

PM



MM




Lab-acquired SARS case

- A 27 year old graduate student tested positive for SARS in September 2003
- No known contacts with SARS patients or travel to active SARS areas
- Student worked on West Nile Virus in BSL3 lab that works with SARS-CoV
- GIS sequenced the virus directly from patient sample using array-based method

Contact tracing of a field sample



Strain	Origin	Position of Varriant Nucleotide (Urbani coordinates)													Del 47*
		9404	9854	17564	18965	19084	19838	21721	22222	22549	23174	23735	23792	28268	
Urhani	Vietnam	T	C	T	T	C	A	G	T	C	C	A	C	C	No
Sin0409	Singapore	T	C	T	A	T	A	G	T	C	C	A	T	T	Yes
SinWNV	Singapore	T	C	T	A	T	A	G	T	C	C	A	T	T	Yes
Sin2774	Singapore	T	C	T	A	T	A	G	T	C	C	A	T	T	No
Sin2748	Singapore	T	C	T	T	T	A	G	T	C	C	A	C	C	No
Sin2500	Singapore	T	C	T	T	T	A	G	T	C	C	A	C	C	No
Sin2677	Singapore	T	C	T	T	T	A	G	T	C	C	A	C	C	No
Sin2679	Singapore	T	C	T	T	C	A	G	T	C	T	A	C	C	No
Sin849	Singapore	T	C	T	T	C	A	G	T	T	T	G	C	C	No
Sin850	Singapore	T	C	T	T	C	A	G	T	T	T	G	C	C	No
Sin842	Singapore	T	C	T	T	C	A	G	T	T	T	G	C	C	No
Sin847	Singapore	T	C	T	T	C	A	G	T	T	T	G	C	C	No
Sin852	Singapore	T	C	T	T	C	A	G	T	T	T	G	C	C	No
Sin848	Singapore	T	C	T	T	C	A	G	T	T	T	G	C	C	No
Sin3765	Singapore	T	C	T	T	C	A	G	T	T	T	G	C	C	No
Sin845	Singapore	T	C	T	T	C	A	G	T	T	T	G	C	C	No
Sin3725	Singapore	T	C	T	T	C	A	G	T	T	T	G	C	C	No
Sin3408	Singapore	T	C	T	T	C	A	G	T	T	T	G	C	C	No
Sin3408L	Singapore	T	C	T	T	C	A	G	T	T	T	G	C	C	No
Sin846	Singapore	T	C	T	T	C	A	G	T	T	T	G	C	C	No



Towards a Treatment for SARS:






- **Identify effective drugs**

Vero cell assay



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Interferons inhibit SARS in plaque assay



SARS-infected Vero cells

Antiviral	Source	Highest concentration tested	Inhibition of cytopathic effect
<i>Interferons</i>			
Interferon α 2a (Roferon®)	Roche	100,000 iu/ml	No
Interferon α 2b (Intron A®)	Schering Plough	500,000 iu/ml	No
Interferon αn1 (Wellferon®)	Glaxosmithkline	500,000 iu/ml	Yes
Interferon αn3 (Alferon®)	Hemispheryx	10,000 iu/ml	Yes
Interferon β 1a (Rebif®)	Serono	500,000 iu/ml	No
Interferon β1b (Betaferon®)	Schering AG	100,000 iu/ml	Yes
<i>Nucleoside analogs</i>			
Acyclovir	Faulding	1000 μ g/ml	No
Amantadine (Symmetrel®)	Novartis	1000 μ g/ml	No
Cymevene (Ganciclovir)	Roche	50,000 μ g/ml	No
Foscarnet (Foscavir®)	Astrazeneca	8000 μ M	No
Ribavirin	ICN Pharma	10,000 μg/ml	Yes**


Applying this model to Dengue

MOH (TTSH), NEA, GIS, STN, DSO, Novartis

- **Capture cases (MOH – Tan Tock Seng Hospital)**
- **Prepare patient samples (STN)**
- **Grow and characterize the virus (DSO, NEA)**
- **Sequence virus and expression analysis (GIS)**
- **Find a treatment (Novartis)**

- **Block access to dangerous agents**
- **Monitor comprehensively**
- **Detect trafficking**
- **Detect outbreak**
- **Use advanced technologies**
- **Trace to source**
- **Integrated and coordinated information dissemination**

The Fundamental Technology



“Sanger” DNA sequencing




Multiplex Sequencing: Mix and Match Technology




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
PCR'd DNA




1) Prepare Adapter Ligated ssDNA Library



2) Clonal Amplification
on 28 μ beads



3) Load beads and enzymes
in PicoTiterPlate™



4) Perform Sequencing by synthesis

454 LIFE
SCIENCES



Sequencing Technologies: Current and Immediate Future

Sequencing a bacterial genome (2 Mb)

	“Sanger” ABI 3730	Roche FLX	Solexa 1G	(Projected) ABI SOLiD
Read length (bp)	750	250	30-40	25-50
Multiplexity (reads)	400K	400K	40M	100M
Total throughput (bp)	10M	100M	1-1.6B	2-3B
Time cost per run	8 hr	8 hr	3 days	3 days
Reagent cost per base in pennies	0.1	0.01	0.001	0.0001
Cost sequencing H. influenza genome (2 Mb)	\$2,000	\$200	\$ 11	\$ 5
Time per bacterial Genome per machine	1.5 hours	0.2 hours	12 minutes for 10	6 minutes for 10

**We can now sequence all possible
samples of microbes in regional
laboratories and
develop a forensic database
of infectious agents**



Discovering microbes in the environment

Viral Genome Discovery

A pilot project




Metagenomic Analyses of an Uncultured Viral Population from Human Feces (a GIS-SDSU collaboration)




Viral Genome Discovery

Isolating viruses from original virus-containing samples




→ Bacterial and big particles



100 µm filter


→ virus → Density gradient



100 kD filter


→ Free nucleotides

Viral Genome Discovery



Viral Genome Discovery

Assemble a whole viral genome
from metagenome sequence data



The 300 RNA viral clones
aligned to the pepper mild mottle virus genome

Viral Genome Discovery




library ID	total clone	known sequence			unknown sequences	
		virus-like		non-virus	virus-like	novel
		plant	animal			
library 1	10576	9934	27	165	110	340
library 2	13572	7106	701	3348	269	2148
library 3	12621	8004	7	4351	11	248
total	36769	25044	735	7864	390	2736

How do we then monitor microbes in the environment ?

- Detect and identify all animal-infecting viruses.
- Detect and identify selected bacteria (respiratory disease focus).
- Discover novel viruses
- Detect presence of co-infections of multiple pathogens
- Sensitive, accurate diagnosis based on *in silico* predictions of hybridization footprint

Nimblegen Technology


- ~380,000 probes
- Maskless photolithography




The Pilot Chip

- **10,722 oligos covering 850 viruses**
- **204 oligos targeting human control genes (immune response)**
- **7-fold replication of all probes**


SIN850 SARS cDNA




PCR-amplified
using SARS-
specific primers.
Only the 40
SARS probes
light up.



RSV + mycoplasma cDNA (from ATCC)



PCR-amplified
using random
primers.
Analysis of
signal intensities
identify presence
of RSV with
100%
confidence.



- **Block access to dangerous agents**
- **Monitor comprehensively**
- **Detect trafficking**
- **Detect outbreak**
- **Use advanced technologies**
- **Trace to source**
- **Integrated and coordinated information dissemination**



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