

Oversight over Dual-Use Research in Africa

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Scope

- Introduction
- Threat perceptions
- Comparison of perceptions
- Challenges to dual-use issue
- Obstacles
- Incentives

Introduction

- Pre 2001 – the debate around biological weapons concentrated on states and security and non-proliferation environment
- 9/11 and Anthrax letters changed the emphasis and threat perceptions and with that the security concerns
- Emphasis on and universality of bioterrorism subject of intense debate

Threat Perceptions

- A number of factors influencing perceptions
 - Environment
 - Issues such as poverty, availability of food
 - Reality of other threats
 - Technological development and focus
 - Political factors
 - Historical background

Comparison of Perceptions

Africa

- Low terrorist threat
- Naturally occurring disease threat is real
- Threat agents are dealt with in nature
- Relevant biotech very small
- Little funding battle for survival

USA

- High terrorist threat
- Bioterrorism very high and real
- Threat agents are more in laboratory
- Relevant biotech very large
- Much more funding and growing

Challenges to Dual-Use Issue

- Recognition - Is there a dual-use issue?
- Threat perception
- Semi political issues
 - Why are scientists singled out
 - Distrust – what do they want to keep from us
 - Efforts to suppress development

Obstacles

- Legal
 - Enforcing national and international
 - Security legislation
- Changing perceptions
- Political issues

Incentives

- Will incentives work?
- Perceptions and attitudes of scientists and managers have to change

Questions