This report is part of a series of surveys related to Iran that CISSM has conducted since 2013. It presents findings about Iranian attitudes on domestic issues drawn from surveys conducted in March 2023 and March 2024, shortly before President Raisi was killed in a helicopter crash in May 2024. A second report will cover findings about public attitudes on foreign policy issues from these two surveys, plus additional findings from a third survey wave conducted in September 2024. Questionnaires and trend tables from all three survey waves will be made available when the second report is released.
Summary of Findings
1. Information Access and Habits (p. 10)
A large majority say they follow the news. Attention to news increased from 2018 to 2023, then returned to the earlier level in March 2024. Domestic television channels remain Iranians’ most frequent source of news, followed closely by social networks. Fewer now say they use social networks “a lot,” but overall participation appears stable. Opposition to government controls on social media has significantly intensified. The audience for VOA and BBC remains at about one in five adults.
2. Iran’s Economic Situation (p. 11)
A majority view Iran’s economic situation as very bad, and a larger majority say it is getting worse. Asked to name the country’s single most important problem, half mention some aspect of the economy, plus another one in ten who mention the sanctions. A majority continues to see domestic mismanagement and corruption as a stronger factor than the sanctions. Four in five think that US sanctions have had a negative impact on the economy, and even more think the sanctions have hurt ordinary people. About four in ten respondents reported they had a job, either full or part-time. A majority report their family’s consumption of red meat has diminished over the last twelve months.
3. Subjective Well-Being, Discontent, and Desire to Emigrate (p. 13)
A majority describe their household’s situation in March 2024 as difficult or very hard. Four in ten say they can get by; only one in twenty feel they are doing better than that. In 2023, over half said they experienced a lot of both worry and enjoyment during a lot of the previous day, while slightly over a third said they felt a lot of sadness. These levels were no different than in 2021. A modest majority thought that they were better off than their parents had been at the same age. Asked whether today’s children, when they grow up, will be better off financially than their parents, a plurality thought that they will. In 2023 almost a quarter said that, given the opportunity, they would like to emigrate (one third among those under 25). Two thirds of those who said so cited economic reasons.
4. Women’s Situation (p. 15)
A clear majority thinks that women who do not wear the hijab should not be confronted. This includes many who think that it would be better if women observed the Hijab in public but should not be confronted if they do not, as well as those who think women should have liberty in what they wear. Almost two thirds reject a recent practice of police treating a lack of hijab observance as a traffic violation.
In 2023 a majority said that the Guidance Patrol should cease operations; three in five thought that, at the least, it should correct its methods. A clear majority thought that most who were arrested in peaceful protests where slogans were chanted against the hijab should be released. A modest majority of women thought that women in Iran are treated with respect and dignity, but over four in ten disagreed. Among men, six in ten thought this, but over a third disagreed. Asked whether they personally were “treated with respect all day” yesterday, nine in ten of both women and men said yes.
Most Iranians were still unfamiliar in 2023 with the long-delayed Majlis bill regarding violence against women. Of those who had heard something about it, four fifths supported passage– basically the same as in 2021.
5. Views of Democracy and Politicians (p. 18)
Three in five Iranians call it absolutely important to live in a country that is governed democratically. Asked how democratically governed Iran is, with “10” as the highest score, the mean rank is in the middle–5.4–slightly down from 2023. Only a third believe that people in Iran feel comfortable voicing their political opinions, but only a quarter say people are afraid–the rest think people are somewhere in between. About three in four expect Iran’s constitution and political system to be about the same in ten years. Although the minority that disagrees grew from 2021 to 2023, it has not grown further in the last twelve months. One in six agree with some protesters’ calls for the Islamic Republic to be replaced with another form of government. Up to one in five expect the system will undergo significant changes within ten years. If only one thing could change about Iran, a slight majority would pick greater economic prosperity over other values.
Among politicians, the late President Raisi’s favorability rating had declined from mid-2022 on, but three fifths still viewed him favorably two months before his death, with a quarter viewing him very favorably. Ghalibaf, the speaker in Parliament, also has declining popularity–now a slim majority views him favorably. Zarif, the past foreign minister, is at the same slight-majority level.
Two months before his death, majorities still have confidence in Raisi’s ability to fulfill various campaign promises by the end of his term, but overall confidence and confidence regarding specific campaign promises is much lower than when he took office.
6. Attitudes toward Protests (p. 23)
Asked in 2024 to think in general about waves of demonstrations over the past ten years, two thirds say their main objective was to demand that officials pay greater attention to people’s problems, while one in five think their main objective was either to demand greater freedoms, or to bring about change in Iran’s system of government. Nearly three in five think the demonstrations have been increasing in frequency–more than thought so in 2021. While only a third think this trend will continue over the next five years, this is up from one quarter in 2021.
Asked why they think most protests over time have been contained, a majority points to the issue of popular support, saying either that there was not enough, or that most Iranians actually opposed the protests. About one in six say that government violence quelled the protests; only one in 20, that the government satisfied protesters’ demands.
Asked how they felt about various complaints and demands voiced by protestors, public agreement has increased for three of them since 2023. Three in five now think the government should not be strict in enforcing Islamic laws (distinctly up from 2018). An overwhelming majority think the government should do more to control food prices, and three quarters say the government is not doing enough to help the poor. Support for demands that the government should fight corruption has been consistently near-unanimous since 2018. The percentage endorsing complaints about government interference in people’s personal lives increased from 2018 to 2023, then stabilized. Support for fundamental regime change has remained steady, around 16% since 2018.
In 2023, asked in different modes whether they had participated in the protests or not, fewer than one in 20 said yes (this would indicate a pool of around 3 million adults). About one in six said they admired those who had participated.
In spring 2023, the public had no shared image of what the protests were about. Asked to reply in their own words, over a third said the protests were about economic grievances. About three in ten said the protests were about women’s freedoms or wider freedoms in general. One in ten said the protesters sought a change in Iran’s system of government. The remainder mostly gave critical characterizations. Half rejected claims that the protests were inspired from abroad, but the rest gave this some degree of credence.
In spring 2023, a majority perceived that the protests were on the whole more violent than they were peaceful. Majorities thought that most peaceful protesters who were arrested should be released. For those who used violence against property or police, or who armed themselves and blockaded roads, substantial majorities supported prosecution and punishments.
7. The March 2024 Parliamentary Election (p. 31)
A majority did not vote in the first round of the election for the Majlis, while a little over four in ten did. The most frequent reason for not voting, given by almost half of non-voters, was a general distrust of the candidates and officialdom more broadly. Another fifth of non-voters say they did not vote because the Majlis cannot fix the economy.
Among those who voted, just under half think the candidates they voted for generally identified as supporters of President Raisi, whatever their political tendency. Over four in ten think their candidates were running as independents, substantially more than principalists or reformists.
A quarter find it hard to locate the candidates they supported on the political spectrum. In the public as a whole, about one in ten could name a person they had wanted to vote for whose candidacy had been rejected by the Guardian Council.
A majority have some confidence that the next Majlis can help Iran move in the right direction; over four in ten do not. A modest majority believe that government officials do not care what people like themselves think. As in the past, three quarters feel that policymakers should take religious teachings into account when they make decisions. About half think some or more policymakers do this; over a third say only a few do so.
The four in ten who did vote were more likely to be older compared to non-voters. Voters are more inclined to feel that officials care what ordinary people think, and that ordinary people feel comfortable in Iran voicing their opinions. They are also more likely to perceive protests as simply a regular recurrence, while non-voters see them as a rising curve.
8. ATTITUDINAL GROUP: Those who Believe Other Iranians are Afraid to Voice Their Political Opinions (p. 35)
In 2023 a quarter of Iranians perceived people in their country as afraid to voice their political opinions. This perception was the most powerful indicator of opposition attitudes–more so than age or media preferences (though these were significant), and far more so than other factors tested. This subgroup was more negative about specific politicians; more likely to say they would leave Iran permanently, given the opportunity; more likely to say women are not treated with respect in Iran; and more likely to view the 2022-23 protests as mostly peaceful.
Methodological Note