ABSTRACT
Guerrilla warfare is perhaps the most iconic strategy that less powerful insurgents have employed to defeat, or at least stymie, much stronger fighting forces. While many have identified the strategic benefits of guerrilla warfare—a protracted and costly conflict degrades the political will of the counterinsurgent—there is much less understanding of why some organizations have the military capacity to implement these strategies and others do not. To fight this way, I argue that insurgents, like any other military actor, need capable small units that can fire and maneuver without suffering extensive losses. Despite the centrality of these capabilities, scholarship on rebel tactical proficiency remains underdeveloped and overlooks what other armed actors do to fight like this on the modern battlefield. I begin by laying out the combat tasks needed to implement guerrilla warfare. With these tasks in hand, this article draws from a large literature on conventional military operations to argue that insurgents seeking to effectively deploy the tactical techniques inherent in guerrilla warfare need skilled and committed small-unit combat leaders who plan operations, train fighters, and generate task-based cohesion. To demonstrate the theory, the article comparatively traces the development of three fighting forces in Afghanistan (2001-2014) and Vietnam (1960-1968).